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Abstract
In October 2014, a 19-year female Syrian tweeter known as Ahlam al-Nasr announced 
her departure from her home in Saudi Arabia and settlement in the territories held by 
the Islamic State Organisation (ISO). As a piece of propaganda, Ahlam’s account of this 
jihadi migration tells as much about the author’s personality as about the kind of sub-
jectivities ISO is trying to appeal to. Ahlam appears as a strongly individualist figure 
as she forcefully asserts ownership of her life plan despite the fact that it was decided 
with her family’s consent. The reasons she give to account for her migration, and to 
encourage her readers to follow suit, also testify to an individualist break with previous 
rationales for transnational jihad: jihad in Syria is not about helping coreligionist in 
distress, but rather about participating in the edification of an ideal Islamic State that 
offers attractive opportunities of self-accomplishment.
Keywords
Islamic State Organisation – women – jihadism – Islamic movements – Syria – foreign 
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 Introduction
In October 2014, supporters and observers of the Islamic State Organisation 
(ISO) were in excitement when the widely followed pro-ISO female blogger 
and tweeter known as “Ahlam al-Nasr the Damascene” announced her arrival 
in Raqqa (ISO’s main urban stronghold in northern Syria) and subsequent mar-
riage with prominent Austrian Jihadi figure Abu Usama al-Gharib.1 Despite 
being only 19-year old by the time she moved to Raqqa, Ahlam had acquired 
online fame as the “poetess of the State of Islam” during the previous months.2 
In October 2014 as well, Iman al-Bugha, a female Syrian professor of Islamic 
studies at the Saudi University of Dammam, announced on her Facebook page 
that she had renounced her “huge salary” in order to head for Raqqa. It was 
subsequently revealed that al-Bugha was none else than the mother of Ahlam 
al-Nasr.3
With regard to the phenomenon of transnational Jihadi volunteerism, the 
cases of Ahlam al-Nasr and Iman al-Bugha exemplify two major developments 
brought about by the Syrian conflict, and more specifically by ISO’s emergence: 
first, the presence among foreign volunteers of an unprecedentedly large con-
tingent of women whose migration is experienced as the product of an indi-
vidual choice rather than as the mere consequence of a decision made by a 
male relative;4 second, the possibility for these female (and male) volunteers 
to express their views and narrate their experience instantaneously thanks 
1    Ahlam al-Nasr’s blog, discontinued in April 2014, was still available at http://ahlam-alnasr 
.blogspot.be/ by January 2015. By that time, her Facebook and Twitter accounts had not been 
reopened after their closure the previous month. Until then, she was rapidly reconstituting 
a following of several thousands after each closure by the management of the host websites.
2    The first collection of her previously released poems in support of ISO was published in July 
2014 by ISO’s media outlet Fursan al-Balagh under the title Awar al-haqq. Al-diwan al-shiʿri 
al-awwal li-shaʿirat al-jihad al-adibat al-fadila Ahlam al-Nasr [Flames of Truth. The First 
Collection of Poems by the Poetess of Jihad, the Noble Writer Ahlam al-Nasr]. Available at 
http://en.calameo.com/books/0040147384df26e156cc9.
3    Al-Hayat, 20 and 24 October 2014, http://alhayat.com/Articles/5161921/-ةيروس-ةييمداكأ
يدادغبلا-عيابتل-ةيدوعس-ةعماج-نم-ليقتست; http://alhayat.com/Articles/5237446/-ةرعاش
-ةيكيرمأ-ةدعاق-في-اهسفن-يرجفت-تلواح-شعاد!. This information was confirmed to the 
authors by a second-degree relative of Ahlam al-Nasr.
4    On the factors behind the unprecedented scale and diversity of the foreign Jihadi contin-
gent in Syria, see Thomas Hegghammer, “Syria’s Foreign Fighters,” Foreign Policy (9 December 
2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/09/syrias-foreign-fighters/.
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to online platforms. The combination of these two developments has given 
female Jihadis in Syria a discursive presence that has no historical precedent.5
This article does not aim to explore the broader blogosphere and 
Twittersphere of female ISO members and supporters, a task that is made 
increasingly difficult with the frequent closure of their accounts by the man-
agement of the host websites. More modestly, we will focus on the figure of 
Ahlam al-Nasr, and in particular on the written personal account of her journey 
to Syria, through which she announced her arrival in Raqqa and subsequent 
marriage.6 This document offers detailed insight into the young woman’s back-
ground, motivations, worldview, and stance on gender relations. Because of 
this, we deemed this personal account more interesting for the present study 
than the content of Ahlam’s blog, which essentially consists in poems and in 
a heated defense of ISO against its enemies, in particular rival Jihadi groups 
such as al-Qaeda. For the same reason, we preferred Ahlam’s travel account 
to the Facebook posts of her mother Iman al-Bugha, whose writings tend to 
be determined by their author’s status as a Muslim scholar, irrespective of her 
sex: they mostly contain authoritative opinions, with rare autobiographical 
elements provided for the sole purpose of bolstering the author’s credentials 
as a religious authority.
It is well-known that religious movements nurturing a conservative concep-
tion of gender relations can at the same time provide women with avenues 
of empowerment. There are two possible ways through which women active 
in such movements can challenge the patriarchal norms that used to con-
strain their involvement outside of the private sphere: the first is their mere 
5    See for instance Joanna Paraszczuk, “Diary Of An Islamic State Wife: British Woman 
In Syria Tells Of Husband’s Death In Kobani,” Radio Free Europe (24 November 2014), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-wives-syria-uk-blog-kobani/26708088.html. On 
other aspects of the use of social media by Jihadi groups active in Syria, see Joseph Carter, 
Shiraz Maher, and Peter R. Neumann, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence 
in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks (London: ICSR, 2014), http://icsr.info/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-
Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf; Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Eye of the Swarm: The Rise of 
ISIS and the Media Mujahedeen”, CPD Blog, 8 July 2014, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/
eye-swarm-rise-isis-and-media-mujahedeen.
6    This account consists in two non-paginated texts, Akhiran rabbuna kataba l-samaha [Finally 
Our Lord Granted Forgiveness], and Al-irhab: al-hayat al-haqiqiyya [Terrorism: The Real 
Life], that were released online by the ISO-affiliated Ghuraba Media Centre on, respectively, 
11 and 22 October 2014. By 15 January 2015 they were still available on the Jihadi online forum 
Ana l-Muslim: http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?538577- اًيرخأ-ملاعلإل-ءابرغلا
رصَّنلا-ملاحأ-ملاسلإا-ةلود-ةرعاش-ملقب-احام َّسلا-َبتك-انُّ بر.
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participation in a social movement, which inherently breaks with an exclu-
sively domestic conception of women’s role in society; the second one is 
discursive criticism of patriarchal values in the name of a “truer” understand-
ing of religion, an approach often described, in Muslim contexts, as “Islamic 
feminism”.7 These two kinds of challenges are not necessarily combined, since 
a large proportion of the women who join Islamic movements discursively 
uphold the patriarchal values they undermine, or at least reshape, in practice.8
Surprisingly perhaps, considering that she belongs to a group that promotes 
one of the most rigorist interpretations of sharia currently known, the stance 
of Ahlam al-Nasr is the opposite to the latter pattern. Indeed, her engagement 
in support of ISO poses no practical challenge to patriarchal authority, but it is 
discursively framed in a way that emphasises the author’s individual autonomy 
against certain patriarchal values. Rather than her deeds, thus, it is the kind of 
individualist subjectivity she displays in her writings that reflects a form of 
empowerment. 
Ahlam’s status as the “poetess of the State of Islam”—a title first granted 
to her by ISO (male) media officer Muʿawiya al-Qahtani—9 is nothing revo-
lutionary from the viewpoint of the Islamic tradition. The blueprint here is 
the famous al-Khansa ʾ, a contemporary of Prophet Muhammad and early con-
vert to Islam known for her elegies of male relatives killed on the battlefield.10 
After her arrival in Raqqa, Ahlam was assigned an utterly “domestic” role by 
ISO, that is, cooking and cleaning for male fighters.11 Contrary to many other 
7     See Margot Badran, Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2009).
8     For a theoretical discussion of this issue, see Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic 
Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
9     Foreword to Nasr, Awar al-haqq, 11.
10    Al-Khansa ʾ was the title of an online magazine for women launched by al-Qaeda members 
in 2004. See Farhana Ali, “Rocking the Cradle to Rocking the World: The Role of Muslim 
Female Fighters,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 8 (2006), 29; Katharina Von 
Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007), 
406–7.
11    Being currently involved in conventional warfare rather than in secretive terrorist activi-
ties, ISO does not need to entrust its female recruits with the kind of operational role 
that has been witnessed during the last decade among female militants in Chechnya, 
Palestine and Iraq (within ISO’ own previous avatars, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and 
the Islamic State in Iraq). Beyond tasks such as those performed by Ahlam, female 
ISO members have been essentially assigned a role in the organisation’s media and in 
its religious police. Al-Hayat, 18 November 2014, http://alhayat.com/Articles/5759079/
تايدوعسلا--ديب-ةدايقلاو--ءاسنلا-نم-شيج--ل-يملاعلإا-رشنلا-لكوي--شعاد-; 
Aksalser, 29 October 2014, http://www.aksalser.com/?page=view_news&id=a3ab50312
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female ISO volunteers, she did not even challenge parental authority by mov-
ing into Syria,12 since she did so in company with her father, mother, and seven 
siblings.13 Likewise, although she married outside of her social milieu, this also 
happened with the consent of her parents. 
In spite of this, Ahlam does challenge a certain set of patriarchal values in 
her account in at least three respects. The first one is the very nature of the 
literary genre she chose to relate her travel to Syria. As will be amply illustrated 
in the article, the texts studied here are not mere diaries, that is, daily records 
of events and thoughts: they include elements of autobiography, that is, an 
attempt at reconstituting the history of the author’s personality.14 Indeed, we 
will show that Ahlam presents her jihadi career as a wholly coherent personal 
trajectory, from birth to marriage. Yet, as Michael Mascuch argues, the capacity 
to produce a unified retrospective autobiographical narrative is the definitive 
characteristic of individualist self-identity.15
Such an assertion of individualism by a woman is unusual in Ahlam’s ultra-
conservative social environment. For sure, her account is not the first text of 
this kind to be written by a female Islamic activist, the most famous precedent 
being Zaynab al-Ghazali’s Days of My Life, published in 1972.16 However, al-
Ghazali’s decision to write this book was legitimised by her status as a senior 
97a41ba66259fa48ee4bff3. On the operational role of women in militant organisations, 
see Cindy Ness (ed.), Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization 
(London: Routledge, 2008); Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Laura Sjöberg and Caron Gentry, Women, Gender, 
and Terrorism (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011); Jessica Davis, “Evolution of the 
Global Jihad: Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36 (2013), 
279–91.
12    A few days after the announcement of Ahlam’s migration to Syria, anti-ISO Jihadi net-
works (that is, for the most part, al-Qaeda sympathisers) launched a social media cam-
paign under the hashtag “No to the mobilisation of women” (la li-nafir al-nisa ʾ) (Zaman 
al-Wasl, 16 October 2014, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/54424.html). By criticising 
the recruitment of young women against parental authority, these networks were actually 
reproaching ISO for being too much egalitarian from a gender perspective, since the same 
networks see no problem with the fact that young male volunteers disregard parental 
authority when they join a land of Jihad.
13    Ahlam is probably the elder daughter in the family, as suggested by the fact that one of her 
sisters is sixteen years younger than her (Tweet, 21 November 2014).
14    Philippe Lejeune, L’Autobiographie en France (Paris: Armand Colin, 2010), 14. 
15    Michael Mascuch, Origins of the Individualist Self : Autobiography and Self-identity in 
England, 1591–1791 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
16    Miriam Cooke, “Zaynab al-Ghazali: Saint or Subversive?,” Die Welt des Islams 34 (1994), 
1–20.
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figure within the Egyptian Islamic movement, and as a survivor of Nasser’s 
torture inferno. The credentials of Ahlam al-Nasr, a teenage blogger, do not 
come close to anything like that. It should be noted, moreover, that al-Ghazali’s 
book did not really create any sort of emulation, as self-narration has remained 
rare among female Islamic activists. Among Jihadi circles more specifically, 
female writings produced before the Syrian war (whose actual authorship by 
women was put into question by some authors) generally consisted in norma-
tive statements, particularly on the role of women in jihad.17
The second way through which Ahlam challenges patriarchal value is by 
proposing a narrative that is utterly dominated by female characters, that is, 
herself and her mother (as well as, secondarily, her marriage broker), whereas 
her father, brothers and new husband feature as mere extra. This feature is 
certainly determined by idiosyncratic factors such as Ahlam’s mother role as 
the brains of the family and, perhaps, by a reluctance to write about men out 
of propriety. It remains that the outcome is a narrative where women occupy 
the frontseats.
Third, Ahlam challenges patriarchal values by emphasising her individual 
agency in order to demonstrate ownership of decisions she made with her 
parents’ consent, that is, moving to Raqqa, and marrying a Jihadi militant. 
Conceptualising that stance as “resistance” would be problematic: since her 
family agreed to her life project, Ahlam had very little to oppose in practice. 
In her writings she rebukes gender conceptions that assign women an exclu-
sively domestic role, but as the figure of her mother suggests, these are not 
conceptions she had to confront at home. Against this background, Ahlam’s 
insistence on her autonomy would be more accurately described as an attempt 
at “reworking and renegotiating connections”:18 she is discursively establishing 
a more equitable relationship with the figures of patriarchy (her parents, her 
husband, ISO), whose authority she wants to be seen as freely embracing out 
of independent moral judgment. 
Ahlam’s case might not seem particularly representative of the broader con-
tingent of transnational female volunteers in ISO, in particular because she 
is not a foreigner but a Syrian national. In reality, legal considerations aside, 
Ahlam’s personal experience is in many ways similar to that of “genuinely” for-
17    Laura Sjöberg, “The Terror of Sex: Significations of Al Qaeda Wives,” Journal of Postcolonial 
Cultures and Societies 4 (2013), 119; Nelly Lahoud, “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ 
Exclusion of Women From Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014), 789–92.
18    Allison Weir, Identities and Freedom: Feminist Theory Between Power and Connection 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144–45.
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eign ISO recruits. When she moved to Raqqa, the young woman did not really 
return to the homeland: first, because she belongs to a Damascene bourgeoisie 
that looks upon the Euphrates valley (ISO’s stronghold today) as a backward 
“far west” not worth the visit; second, from her perspective, Ahlam did not 
move to “the so-called Syria”,19 but to a new homeland—the Caliphate—that 
happens to be located in a region which, like many Islamists, she usually 
refers to by using the premodern nomenclature of “Sham”; third, we will see 
that upon her arrival in Raqqa, al-Nasr did not “reintegrate” Syrian society, but 
rather joined a community of like-minded foreigners. 
More important here is the fact that whatever Ahlam’s social profile, her 
writings are definitely conceived by herself and by ISO’s leadership as a pro-
paganda tool aimed at a broad audience of potential (female) recruits. As 
mentioned above, her travel account was published by an ISO-affiliated online 
media outlet, and it features several calls on the reader to head for the land of 
the Caliphate. The arguments Ahlam uses to support that call are informative 
of the subjectivities ISO is trying to appeal to, notably by hinting at incentives. 
In her travel account, Jihad in Syria is not about helping Syrians suffering at 
the hands of the Asad regime: it is rather about becoming, to use an expres-
sion borrowed from both Ahlam’s text and Titanic’s famous scene, the “king (s) 
of the world”.20 This means living one’s strict observance of Islam in absolute 
freedom, participating in the establishment of a brand new state perceived 
as integrally Islamic, exerting quasi-colonial authority over a local population 
seen as in need of religious edification, and possibly, marrying at an earlier age 
than what one would reasonably expect in one’s homeland.
In the first section of the article, we present Ahlam’s family background by 
focusing in particular on the figure of her mother. The second section con-
cerns the role of Ahlam in her family’s decision to leave Dammam for Raqqa. 
The third one addresses the motivations of Ahlam and her relatives, that is, 
the nature of the struggle that pushes them to migrate to the “land of the 
Caliphate”. In the fourth section we study the idealized vision of the Islamic 
State proposed by Ahlam. In the fifth and last section, we analyse her marriage 
in terms of ethics, that is, the moral principles that preside over the conclusion 
of that union, and politics, that is, the significance of the marriage for ISO and 
its propaganda. 
19    Nasr, Al-irhab. 
20    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba.
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 Family Background
Ahlam al-Nasr, which in Arabic means “dreams of victory”, is the keyboard 
name of Shayma ʾ al-Haddad.21 Although the use of a pseudonym was probably 
motivated by the risks associated with posting pro-ISO contents online from 
Saudi Arabia, Ahlam did not disclose her real name after her arrival to Raqqa 
and kept on signing her writings with the name under which she rose to fame. 
Ahlam did not give any details about the identity of her parents either, as 
she merely mentioned the fact that they were well-off Damascene expatriates 
living in one of the Gulf monarchies. In spite of that, we know that she stems 
from a prestigious family of religious scholars. Her father is Tawfiq al-Haddad, 
a pharmacist and a reputed Quran memoriser.22 As already mentioned, her 
mother is Iman al-Bugha, a professor of usul al-fiqh (sources of jurisprudence) 
and Islamic economics at the University of Dammam. 
Iman’s father and Ahlam’s grandfather is Mustafa Dib al-Bugha (b. 1938), 
one of Syria’s most prominent religious scholars. The son of the trustee of the 
butchers of Damascus, al-Bugha taught at the Sharia Faculty at the University 
of Damascus during the 1980s and 1990s, before he was recruited by Qatari 
and Jordanian universities. In 2006, he returned to Syria to occupy what was 
reportedly the best paid teaching position of the country at the private al-Fath 
Institute. He also started preaching at the Zayn al-‘Abidin mosque, one of the 
largest of his native neighbourhood of al-Midan. In theory, Mustafa al-Bugha’s 
pedigree provided for uneasy relations with the regime: his master was Sheikh 
Hasan Habannaka (d. 1978), who led the ulama’s opposition to the Ba‘th in 
the 1960s, and by the late 1970s, al-Bugha was presiding over the al-Ghawas 
mosque, a notorious hotbed of militant Islamism. Thirty years later, however, 
the scholar had been coopted by the regime: he was one of the very rare ulama 
to be paid the honour of a personal visit by President Bashar al-Asad, and one 
of the members of the dormant, yet exclusive Higher Council for Ifta ʾ (fatwa 
giving). His sons—Iman’s brothers—had moved even closer to the regime: 
21    We obtained her real name through one of her second-degree relatives (Skype conver-
sation, 10 January 2015). It is under that name that she published her first collection of 
poems, The Epic Battle of Gaza (Malhama Ghazza) at the Saudi Dar al-Kifah in 2010, that 
is, at the age of 15. See Shayma ʾ al-Haddad, “Hawla diwan malhama Ghazza [About the 
poem collection The Epic Battle of Gaza]”, Rabita Udaba ʾ al-Sham, 2 October 2010, http://
www.odabasham.net/show.php?sid=39312.
22    We obtained this information from the aforementioned relative. Haddad is a hafiz jami‘, 
that is, someone who has memorised the ten different readings (methods of recitation) 
of the Quran. Before his departure for Syria, Tawfiq al-Haddad was teaching Quran recita-
tion across Saudi Arabia.
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Hasan, who was appointed in 2007 as the Dean of the Faculty of Sharia, was 
widely criticised for implementing reforms reportedly inspired by the secu-
rity apparatus, and his brother Anas made an unsuccessful attempt at being 
elected in the country’s rump parliament.23
During the first year that followed the 2011 uprising, al-Bugha remained 
quiet, which owed him to feature on a “list of shame” circulated by opposi-
tion activists on the internet. However, when state repression turned into all-
out war with the bombardment of Homs in February 2012, the scholar shamed 
the regime in his sermons,24 as a result of which he and his son Anas were 
assaulted in the street by pro-regime thugs.25 By that time, his mosque was 
one of the last in central Damascus to witness weekly demonstrations. In the 
following months, as war and repression intensified, al-Bugha retreated into 
silence once again.
Contrary to her relatively quiescent father, and thanks to her politically 
more permissive Saudi environment, al-Bugha’s daughter Iman had been 
known for several years as a passionate proponent of Jihadi ideology within 
private female Islamic circles in the Kingdom’s Eastern region.26 As she put it 
after her migration to Raqqa, “I was a Daeshite in thought and method.27 I was 
a Daeshite before Daesh was there. I have known for a long time that the only 
solution for Muslims is jihad.”28
Although in her own posts and tweets Iman al-Bugha never mentions 
her famous father, she does emphasise her religious training among the dis-
ciples of Hasan Habannaka. This is a way for her to claim that her radical 
views, such as the practice of takfir (excommunication),29 are rooted in the 
23    Thomas Pierret, Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013),38–39, 45, 87, 101, 153.
24    Mustafa Dib al-Bugha, “Huquq al-muslimin wa bayan aʿzam al-dhunub al-mawbiqa 
bi-sahibiha wa minha hatk al-ʿird wal-nafs [The Muslims’ rights: Expounding the 
most perilous sins for those who commit them, including sexual assault and mur-
der]”, Youtube, 2 January 2014 (pronounced in early 2012), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=-MrY43nkPJc.
25    Anas Mustafa al-Bugha, Facebook post, 30 April 2012.
26    Al-Hayat, 20 October 2014.
27    “Daesh” is the acronym for ISO’s official Arabic name between April 2013 and June 2014 
(al-dawlat al-islamiyya fi-l-‘iraq wal-sham). It was used in a derogatory way by ISO’s oppo-
nents, and as such, rejected by the organisation itself. Its use by al-Bugha is an example of 
a stigma being turned into a source of pride.
28    Iman al-Bugha, (untitled article), 20 October 2014, http://justpaste.it/hn3o.
29    Tweet, 1 December 2014. 
250 Pierret AND Cheikh
hawwa 13 (2015) 241–269
mainstream Damascene Islamic tradition and do not result from the influence 
of Wahhabism, a suggestion she forcefully denies.30
Far from a recent conversion, thus, the Jihadi stance of Iman al-Bugha’s 
daughter Ahlam is rooted in a long exposure to such ideas within her fam-
ily environment. As Ahlam puts it, “my parents follow the (Jihadi) precepts 
(al-ahl ʿala l-manhaj)”.31 Before 2014, however, this ideological orientation did 
not translate into any actual involvement in militant activities beyond Iman 
al-Bugha’s preaching. For the rest, the family’s “Jihadism” manifested itself 
in some form of ethical consumerism, and more particularly in the—often 
impractical—avoidance of Western-made products:
One of my brothers, when he was a child, was passionate about car toys. . . . 
He found the car toy of his dreams in a shop, but—following in this the 
family’s habit when buying something—he first checked out the country 
where the toy was made, and he discovered that it was the United States! 
He did not hesitate, and put the car back on its shelf, claiming he would 
not buy it, even for a cheap price . . . I had not thought he would give up 
on the toy so easily, and that I would not be forced to convince him to do 
so. . . . When we were forced to buy some foreign appliance, their was an 
atmosphere of mourning at home, and our mother was trying to comfort 
us by insisting that this appliance was “necessary” rather than superflu-
ous, that it was saving us time we could use to study religion and serve 
Islam. Only then would we settle down, while handling the appliance 
with utmost care in order not to have to replace it.32
In this anecdote as in the rest of the text, the mother, Iman, is portrayed as the 
brains of the family: in this case, she is the one who, having promoted anti-
Americanism among her children, finds herself forced to adjust it to frustrating 
practical realities. Independently of the nature of Iman’s ideas, the female role-
model she represents is important to understand the constitution of Ahlam’s 
own subjectivity: it is natural for her that a woman holds a university degree, 
works outside of her home, and expresses political views. This is something 
one must keep in mind in order to avoid misinterpreting Ahlam’s assertion 
of autonomy as a break with “tradition”: it is more accurately described as the 
product of a century of women’s empowerment in the region through educa-
tion and non-domestic work. This applies also, and sometimes primarily, to 
30    Facebook post, 7 November 2014.
31    Nasr, Al-irhab.
32    Ibid.
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conservative countries like Saudi Arabia. In the latter, indeed, gender segrega-
tion, notably in higher education, has provided women from relatively privi-
leged social classes with career opportunities that might not necessarily exist 
elsewhere: in Syria, for instance, where universities are not segregated, women 
in the country’s Sharia faculties are still to occupy professorial positions simi-
lar to the one held by Iman al-Bugha.33
 Longing for the Caliphate
O God these are my heart’s sighs
They give me sleepless nights
When, O God, will you do me that honour?
When, O God, will you grant me forgiveness?
My happiness is a pen and a sword
So that the years of my life resuscitate through struggle
This will remain my dearest wish
Even if I was given the greatest honours and success
And this will remain my obsession as long as I live:
When will my hand clasp a weapon?34
This excerpt from a poem Ahlam wrote before her migration to Syria opens the 
first section of her travel account, thereby setting the stage for her narration. 
As soon as the re-establishment of the Caliphate was announced by ISO in 
June 2014, she tried to leave for Syria in company with one of her brothers, but 
the failure of that first attempt plunged her in a state of despair:
I was feeling a pain of a kind I had never known . . . The Islamic Caliphate 
was the dream of my life since the dawn of my childhood, but my only 
share of it were social media accounts that were closed down from time 
to time. . . . The situation of the one who is far from the Caliphate and 
impatient for it is like the situation of a fish hanging by the tail just above 
the surface of the sea, seeing it but unable to reach it. . . . O Lord, have 
mercy on me!35
33    On gender segregation (notably in higher education) in Saudi Arabia, see Amélie Le 
Renard, A Society of Young Women: Opportunities of Place, Power, and Reform in Saudi 
Arabia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).
34    Ahlam al-Nasr, “Zafra [Sigh],” in Awar al-haqq, 43.
35    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba.
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In order to appease the Almighty, Ahlam decided for an increase in religious 
observance, “abandoning even the smallest sin . . . and multiplying virtuous 
actions”. Daily charity and night prayer, in particular, played a major role in 
“making things easier”, that is, in convincing God to open the gates of the 
Caliphate for her.36 From the very first pages of her account, thus, Ahlam’s 
departure is presented as a distinctly individual project: one she has nurtured 
all of her life, one she has been longing and suffering for, and one she eventu-
ally helped turn into reality through her virtuousness.
We do not know if Ahlam’s parents were aware of her first attempt at travel-
ing to Syria. Although they had infused the family with the love of jihad, Ahlam 
acknowledges, they were reluctant to move to the land of the Caliphate out 
of fear for their children, with the result that the latter threatened to flee the 
household: 
At home, we were no longer discussing anything else than migration to 
Syria, jihad, and the Caliphate, days and night, all the time, every minute. 
My siblings and I were insisting all the time: “Please, let us migrate with 
your consent, so that we don’t have to escape; because we have decided 
to do our duty as Muslims”.37
Ahlam takes personal credit for eventually succeeding in changing the mind of 
her parents: “They were convinced, thanks God, and since I felt responsible for 
that, I proposed to travel with my father first (something my parents accepted 
with difficulty), in order to prepare the arrival of the rest of the family”.38 Still, 
on the eve of the departure, an incident provoked by Iman al-Bugha’s irrepress-
ible motherly feelings provided her daughter with the opportunity to empha-
sise both her ideological debt to her mother, and her own appropriation of that 
legacy as an autonomous subject:
When the long-awaited night arrived, my mother was walking back and 
forth in front of my room. I was faking sleep, because I did not want to see 
her cry, neither did I want to change my plans for any reason. . . . But my 
mother broke into my room and came to me. She was crying . . . express-
ing her fears, and invoking God for me. I had to bite my lips to avoid cry-
ing myself. Then I told her, while rubbing her head: “Whatever you forgot, 
I won’t forget what you told me once, mother, do you remember? You told 
36    Ibid.
37    Ibid.
38    Ibid.
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me that when you held me in your arms for the first time after I came to 
this world, you said: ‘This child will serve Islam’. I want to serve it for real. 
For what purpose did you raise me?! What is that thing you were glorify-
ing and in the love of which I grew up? Jihad! The Caliphate! Islamic rule! 
It is our collective duty!”
In the passage above, it appears that the legacy of Ahlam’s mother is not only 
a matter of education, but also one of dedication at birth. What is interesting 
here, apart from the fact that Ahlam manages to reassert her agency despite 
this dedication, is the purely feminine character of Jihadi filiation in the family, 
as mother and daughter are presented as the chief transmitter and recipient of 
this ideological heritage: it is the mother who dedicates her child to the cause 
of Islam, and it is implied that she specifically did so with her (“this child”).
 Enemies and Motivations
For decades, militant Islamists have been concerned with two main categories 
of enemies coined by Egyptian ideologue ʿAbd al-Salam Farag (1945–82) in his 
Absent Duty: the “near enemy”, that is, nominally Muslim rulers presiding over 
un-Islamic regimes, and the “far enemy”, that is, non-Muslim hostile powers 
such as Israel and the United States.39
Ahlam’s hatred seems evenly shared between the two enemies. Discursively, 
she devotes the bulk of her energy to the vilification of the “tyrants of unbe-
lief” (tawaghit al-kufr), that is, nominally Muslim rulers whom she reproaches 
for “overtly professing atheism”, and for using their repressive apparatus to 
prevent Islamic militants from opposing the far enemy by force.40 The result-
ing oppression of Muslims across the world has ignited a “fire in (her) heart” 
which, she claims, can only be extinguished with the “blood of the tyrants”.41 
When she finally left Saudi Arabia for Turkey, therefore, she looked through 
the window of the plane and swore to herself: “I won’t come back here unless 
as a military conqueror ( fatiha)”.42 In this latter quote, Ahlam does more than 
designating an enemy: by virtually applying to herself a title that is rarely used 
39    Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 70 sq.
40    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba.
41    Nasr, Al-irhab.
42    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba.
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in its feminine form ( fatih, -a), she forces her way into a manly realm par excel-
lence, that is, warfare.
Although the far enemy features less prominently in Ahlam’s text, it nev-
ertheless ranks high on her list of priorities, as illustrated by her claim that 
she thought about carrying out a suicide attack against a US military facility: 
“I found myself faced with two possibilities, not three: either heading for the 
land of the Caliphate, or conducting a martyrdom operation against one of the 
American bases located in the Gulf statelets.”43
In Syria, however, the enemy ISO has fought the most fiercely is neither 
the near nor the far one but, besides Kurdish nationalists, Arab Sunni rebels 
opposing the Asad regime. Although the fundamental problem for ISO is that 
these rebels refuse to recognise the group as the legitimate state authority, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi’s followers have emphasised other issues to justify their hos-
tility to them. The first is the rebels’ alleged rogue behavior, which makes civil-
ians feel insecure in the areas they control.44 Ahlam echoes this trope when 
she narrates her arrival in Syria from Turkey on board of a public microbus: 
The driver was asking God that we don’t be stopped at a checkpoint of 
the Free Army (it would more appropriately be called the “Shitty Army”),45 
or of the Saluli Front,46 because their fighters are nervous, and they are 
thieves . . . As for the checkpoints of the Islamic state, there are no prob-
lems there, no tolls and no bad behaviour on the part of the fighters who 
man them . . . People feel secure.47
43    Ibid. US troops withdrew from Saudi Arabia in 2003, but Washington maintains major 
military facilities in neighbouring countries, including a naval base in Bahrain, that is, one 
hour drive away from Dammam. 
44    This is certainly true for many rebel factions, but ISO has an obvious interest in abusively 
generalising that accusation.
45    Ahlam does not actually use the adjective “shitty”, but insists that the letter “h (a)” in hurr 
(“free”) should be replaced with the following letter in the alphabet, that is, “kh (a)”. Khara 
means “shit” in Arabic.
46    Derogatory surname for the Islamic Front, a mainstream Islamist rebel coalition that has 
been at war with ISO since January 2014. The epithet “Saluli” refers to Abdallah bin Ubay 
bin Salul, a tribal chief in Yathrib (Medina) at the time of the Prophet. Ibn Salul is remem-
bered in the Islamic tradition as the archetypical example of a hypocrite (munafiq), that 
is, someone who insincerely embraced Islam. In ISO’s propaganda, the royal Saudi family 
is frequently called “Al Salul” instead of “Al Saʿud”.
47    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba.
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ISO supporters also demonise the rebels for their ties with both the near and 
the far enemy, that is, Western countries and regional states such as Turkey 
and the Gulf monarchies. Drawing from ISO’s standard lexicon in that respect, 
Ahlam brands these groups as US “agents of the West and the Gulf tyrants” and 
calls them “sahwat”,48 a reference to the Sunni auxiliaries known as Awakening 
Councils (majalis al-sahwa, or sahwat) that the US army recruited in Iraq after 
2006 in order to fight ISO’s predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq. 
What is more counter-intuitive than these insults is the rather secondary 
status of the Asad regime in al-Nasr’s demonology. As said above, her text is 
replete with attacks against the “tyrants” of the region, but these attacks are 
formulated in general terms and target Gulf monarchs as much as (if not more 
than) the Syrian regime, that is mentioned on only three occasions in the two 
texts. Strikingly, although the “Muslims’ suffering” in general is frequently 
evoked, Asad’s atrocities against the Syrian population are never mentioned 
specifically, either as a motivation for Ahlam’s own decision to head for Syria, 
or as an argument to convince her readers to follow suit. This absence is espe-
cially astonishing in a paragraph in which the young woman evokes the Muslim 
causes that contributed to building her political awareness. Following in this 
a trope of Jihadi literature since the 1980s, she provides a long list of countries 
where Muslims have allegedly been oppressed—“Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, many African states, Afghanistan, 
and Bangladesh,”49 but bizarrely fails to mention Syria.50
This relative disinterest in the regime on the part of Ahlam is actually unsur-
prising since, for geographic reasons, but also because of strategic priorities on 
both sides, ISO and Damascus’ forces have fought the rebels much more than 
they have fought each other.51 Moreover, ISO’s agenda is not revolutionary in 
the classical sense, that is, bent on replacing the incumbent regime and take 
over the existing state structure: it rather consists in building a whole new state 
from scratch in the power vacuum stretching across the Syrian-Iraqi border. As 
a result, whereas in their rhetoric mainstream rebels focus on the evils of the 
48    Ibid.
49    See the sections on Abdallah ʿAzzam (by Thomas Hegghammer) and Usama bin Laden (by 
Omar Saghi) in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al Qaeda in its own words (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 11–146.
50    Nasr, Al-irhab.
51    According to IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, only 13% of the attacks car-
ried out by ISO between 1 January and 21 November 2014 targeted regime forces. For the 
same period, only 6% of regime operations targeted ISO (NBC News, 11 December 2014, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/syria-isis-have-been-ignoring-each-other- 
battlefield-data-suggests-n264551).
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Asad regime, ISO is chiefly concerned with highlighting the virtues of its brand 
new state structures.52 The latter is obviously more appealing than the former 
to Ahlam and her family, who avowedly decided to head for “jihad” only after 
the Caliphate was proclaimed in June 2014, that is, after three years of uprising, 
state repression, and civil war. 
What precedes is revealing of a major difference between the Syrian war and 
previous examples of transnational Jihadi mobilisations: whereas foreign fight-
ers who were traveling to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq (before the 
Syrian civil war) were motivated by the defense of oppressed coreligionists,53 
a non-negligible number of ISO’s foreign recruits, like Ahlam and her family, 
are in fact attracted by the utopian prospect of living an integrally Islamic exis-
tence unsullied by the worldly compromises they encounter elsewhere on the 
planet. They used to care about Muslim suffering around the world, but what 
eventually decided them to radically change their lifestyle and abandon the 
comfort of Dammam was the opportunity to live in God’s Kingdom on Earth.
 Paradise Now
What Ahlam discovers after crossing the first ISO checkpoint is a view of 
paradise. The recent establishment of Islamic rule is not only reflected in the 
symbols of the new state and in demonstrations of piety, but also, as a Godly 
reward for submitting to His will, by the beauty of the natural setting, a pros-
perous economy, and military victories. 
Finally, I saw the banner of the Caliphate floating high, and I saw the road 
signs indicating the direction of the provinces (wilayat).54
I saw the building of the Traffic Directorate and the Islamic Police, the 
headquarters of the noble hisba,55 the Office of Zakat, the Islamic Court, 
the Information Centres that distribute Islamic publications, the screens 
52    See for instance the content of Dabiq, the magazine launched by ISO after the proclama-
tion of the Caliphate.
53    The blueprint for this kind of mobilisation was set up by Abdallah ʿAzzam from 1979 
onwards (see Kepel and Milelli, Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words, 81–146).
54    Whereas under the current regime, the largest administrative unit in Syria is called muha-
faza, ISO has divided the territories it controls into wilayat.
55    Religious police in the strict sense, that is, the one concerned with vice and virtue, in addi-
tion to the supervision of market prices. The “Islamic Police” is the regular police, hence 
its location in the same building as the Traffic Directorate.
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that display the material produced by the Caliphate . . . My God! Is that 
happening in the Syria that was once called “Asad’s Syria”? Is this the 
Syria that saw the spread of unveiling, singing, music and all kind of 
idiocies . . .?
The Euphrates looked limpid and fresh, calm like a venerable old man, 
with the zephyr blowing over it, the branches and leaves of the trees 
bending over it, and a clean, invigorating, cool air. The tape recorder in 
the bus was relentlessly playing the holy surahs of the Quran, followed by 
lectures calling for jihad. Life is beautiful (here) my sisters, full of Godly 
blessings and gifts . . . We can achieve all of this when we rule according 
to Islam. In the land of the Caliphate I saw (female) modesty and piety, 
and people who close down their shop for prayer. Likewise, I saw vibrant 
commerce and abundant goods, a variety of fresh vegetables, and chil-
dren playing, happy and joyful, repeating enthusiastically (ISO’s slogan): 
“The Islamic State will remain!”
Every day there are new military victories . . . unlike in the regions held 
by the idiotic leaders of the apostate (rebel) factions: there, every day 
brings failure and defeat . . .56
Among the virtues of the new state is security, from criminals, as narrated 
above, but also from the police of the “tyrants”, a major source of anxiety for a 
Jihadi blogger like Ahlam while she was living in Dammam: “no more fear of 
arrest and prosecution . . . For the first time I keep the wolf from the door, for 
the first time I am not anxious when I see the police, for the first time I invoke 
God for the ruler!”57
In order to make her description relevant to a broader audience of observant 
Muslims, Ahlam also highlights the possibility, in ISO-controlled region, to dis-
play religious signs that are unproblematic in Saudi Arabia but not elsewhere, 
for instance under secular-oriented regimes and in non-Muslim majority con-
texts: “O supporters of the Caliphate . . . come on and freely practice Islam! 
Come to the place where the face-veil is not forbidden, where growing a beard 
does not lead to imprisonment . . .”58 From that viewpoint, life in the Caliphate 
is not only secure, it is also synonymous with freedom and self-assertion, at 
least for those who support and contribute to ISO’s project. Such a claim might 
seem absurd to a secular-liberal audience, but taking it into account is crucial 
for understanding the motivations of ISO’s foreign recruits.
56    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba.
57    Ibid.
58    Ibid.
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Here is perhaps the clearest illustration of the distinctly individualist break 
with former rationales for transnational Jihadi volunteerism: whereas previous 
generations of foreign fighters were deliberately choosing a life of hardship 
(and in Chechnya, most likely, death)59 out of the sacred duty of helping down-
trodden fellow Muslims, Ahlam makes it clear, when trying to convince her 
readers to head for the land of the Caliphate, that the latter offers much better 
possibilities of self-accomplishment than their present homeland:
Here everything you need is provided to you, thank God, life is hectic 
and it is characterised, above all, by peace of mind and psychological 
stability. I am very happy here, thank God . . . Come here, ask for the 
afterworld only, and you will get both this world and the afterworld, God 
willing . . . Try to rally (your brothers here) and you will live in this world 
as if you were its kings. . . . Who said that jihad was a life of self-murder 
and darkness?60
Beyond the liberties it provides to strictly observant believers, the new regime 
is showing virtues that Muslim used to know “only from history books”: “order 
and discipline, exhortation and accountability, respect for the subjects . . . Every 
(ISO fighter) is a compassionate father for the people”.61 Ahlam’s recounts sev-
eral anecdotes testifying to the outstanding probity and generosity of ISO’s 
fighters, which she contrasts with the spread of bribery under the previous 
regime. In these anecdotes, Jihadis are portrayed as missionaries in arms, dis-
playing benevolent paternalism towards submissive (and visibly fearful) local 
sinners like this vendor at a gas station:
ISO FIGHTER: Why do you smoke?
VENDOR: I’m not smoking, it’s the smell of gas. 
ISO FIGHTER:  I smoked for a long time when I was ignorant of Islam, 
so don’t lie to me.
VENDOR: Yes, you’re right.
ISO FIGHTER: What’s the benefit from such a sin?
VENDOR: Nothing, my sheikh.
ISO FIGHTER: Do you smoke in front of your children?
59    Whereas the death rate among foreign fighters in Afghanistan in the 1980s was as low as 
2 to 6%, it was superior to 50% in Chechnya. Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim 
Foreign Fighters. Islam and the Globalisation of Jihad”, International Security 35 (2010/11), 63. 
60    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba. Both underlined passages are our emphasis.
61    Ibid.
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VENDOR: Yes, my sheikh.
ISO FIGHTER:  What kind of example are you giving to them? Is that 
the generation that will liberate Jerusalem?
VENDOR: No for sure.
ISO FIGHTER:  Do you see that man next to the driver? He was a rap 
singer for years,62 then he converted to Islam and 
became a mujahid (jihad fighter). Can you believe that 
people come from Europe to conduct jihad, whereas the 
Muslims in their countries are offending God by their 
sins?
VENDOR: No, I can’t believe this.
ISO FIGHTER: What’s the price of the gas I bought?
VENDOR: 2400 liras. 
ISO FIGHTER:  (After giving the vendor 2500 liras) I want a promise 
from you.
VENDOR: That I return 100 liras to you?
ISO FIGHTER:  No, it’s yours, but I want you to repent, and stop smok-
ing today.
VENDOR: I promise, sheikh.
More surprising is al-Nasr’s minimisation of the threat constituted by the 
US-led air campaign that started in late September 2014: “What Coalition? 
What bombardment? What violence?” she asks. In her account, her new 
homeland does not really look like nation at war, but one where one can perish 
in an airstrike just like one can die elsewhere “from a car accident”. It is not so 
much that the danger does not exist, but that genuinely faithful Muslims such 
as those who are building the Caliphate do simply not pay attention to it: “Life 
goes on . . . When you live an elevated Islamic life, you don’t see unbelief to 
start with, you don’t care about it.”63
Ahlam’s first contact with the land of the Caliphate looks somewhat like 
a touristic visit: she made a “tour” ( jawla) in the province of Raqqa as a 
honeymoon,64 and when she entered one of the city’s gun shops (“a nice little 
62    This former rap singer is probably Denis Mamadou Gerhard Cuspert, alias Deso Dogg, 
alias Abu Talha al-Almani, a German ISO recruit with close ties to Ahlam’s husband. See 
Al Monitor, 21 February 2014,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/deso-
dogg-germany-salafists-syria-jihad.html##ixzz3Ob92ncGL.
63    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba.
64    By July 2014, ISO started to organise twice-weekly tours across its territories for just married 
Jihadis and civilians (Naharnet, 29 July 2014, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/140865).
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terrorist shop”, as she ironically calls it), it was in order to collect fancy souve-
nirs as much as to equip herself: “I bought a few things . . . and I finally grasped 
a weapon! The people who were with me offered me a stun grenade, a dagger, 
a cartridge of Dushka,65 a flag of the Caliphate, and other great things I had 
not even dreamt of ever possessing.”66 As often in her account, Ahlam appears 
here as an over-excited teenager fixated upon the Jihadi universe the same way 
other girls from her generation are enamored with some pop idol.
After shopping, Ahlam was trained to the use and maintenance of what she 
calls her new “friend”, that is, her rifle. She details each step of the two opera-
tions at length in the text, as a proud display of her newly acquired expertise. 
The playful character of the shooting session places it somewhere between 
military training and entertainment: “The people with me told me: ‘Ahlam, 
imagine that you have the leaders of the infidel Coalition in front of you, then 
shoot’.”67 In gruesome terms, Ahlam expresses the wish that this training will 
make place for actual fighting any time soon: “I ask God he grants me the 
chance to blow up the head of an infidel any time soon! And that I slaughter 
an apostate soldier.”68
Here again, by displaying her newly acquired familiarity with military 
hardware, adopting a brutal rhetoric, and discursively assigning herself the 
role of a warrior—a widespread feature among pro-ISO female social media 
users,69 Ahlam appropriates symbols that have remained essentially male 
ones among Islamic movements. By doing so, indeed, she goes against a per-
vasive tradition among jihadi groups: although as noted earlier the latter have 
sometimes entrusted female militants with suicide attacks, they have generally 
opposed their participation in conventional operations involving the use of 
firearms.70At the time of writing, however, Ahlam’s contact with the battlefield 
remained virtual, and her contribution to the construction of the Caliphate 
followed very traditional patterns of gender roles:
65    Russian-made heavy machine gun. 
66    Nasr, Akhiran rabbuna kataba.
67    Ibid.
68    Ibid.
69    In a (now deleted) Facebook post from October 2014, a female French ISO-member 
released a picture of firearms spread over the satin bedsheets of her room, offering to sell 
them at “cheap price”. Guns are also common as a profile picture for pro-ISO female users.
70    See Lahoud, “Neglected Sex”.
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I was allowed to cook for the mujahidin, I was almost flying out of joy. I 
was literally obsessed with making sure that everything was clean and 
good. I started repeating: ‘This food will be eaten by the mujahidin; this 
silverware will be used by the mujahidin. I am now among the mujahi-
din . . . Is that real, or is it a dream?’71
Ahlam’s enthusiasm towards her tasks might be sincere, but an obvious gap 
persists between her expectations and the reality of her participation in ISO’s 
activities. The military training provided to her on her arrival might be a way to 
manage such expectations among female members, but it remains to be seen 
if this will prove sufficient in the long term. 
 Ethics and Politics of a Jihadi Marriage
The second part of Ahlam’s account, Terrorism: The Real Life, is essentially 
devoted to her marriage shortly after her arrival in Raqqa. In the Islamic tradi-
tion, marriage entails a (re)assertion of authority over the bride by two male 
figures, that is, the bride’s father and the groom. In her narration Ahlam does 
not reject this male authority, but she nevertheless reasserts her individual 
agency. Although it is justified by “security reasons”, the fact that her marriage 
is not mentioned at all in the first text Finally God Granted Us Forgiveness (she 
only refers to a forthcoming, ground-breaking “surprise”) allows her to narrate 
the whole process of her migration to Syria without being overshadowed by 
the figure of her husband: this is the story of Ahlam al-Nasr, not of Abu Usama 
al-Gharib’s wife.
In addition to that, the marriage is presented as the culmination of a trajec-
tory that was defined all along by Ahlam’s own individual decisions. The union 
is concluded with the consent and in presence of Ahlam’s father, but the young 
woman feels obliged to justify what is probably self-evident to most observant 
Muslim readers: “He is my legal guardian (wali al-amr), the one who married 
me”.72 For the rest, Ahlam frames her marriage as the accomplishment of a 
long-standing, carefully planned personal project by claiming that she always 
wanted to marry a mujahid, and that short of that, she would have remained 
single. This is quite a bold statement in a conservative society that sees mar-
riage as a necessary part of any woman’s personal accomplishment. Not that 
71    Ibid.
72    Nasr, Al-irhab.
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female celibate is exceptional in Middle Eastern societies: for reasons that will 
be explained below, it is even increasingly common. However, it remains expe-
rienced by most women as a shameful situation imposed by circumstances 
rather than as a choice. In such a context, conditioning marriage on such a 
restrictive criterion as the one defined by Ahlam is expectedly perceived as 
foolish:
Sometimes, my friends were discussing their future life . . . When they 
were asking me about my criteria (for marriage), I used to say: “my crite-
rion is that he be a mujahidin, that’s what really matters to me”. They used 
to laugh until they realise I was serious about it: “How? That’s impossible”. 
I used to say: “First, it’s what I want, it’s what fundamentally suits me. 
Second, God is omnipotent.” One of them, laughing, asked me: “What if it 
doesn’t happen?” I replied: “Then I will never marry, because I will never 
allow anything to turn me away from jihad and the causes of the umma 
(global Muslim community).”
Later on, each time the travails of the Muslims increased, I became 
more intransigent on that condition . . . The number of pretenders 
increased, all of them with many qualities, as God was testing me, but my 
answer was always: “no, because he is not a mujahid”.73
In support of that stance, Ahlam offers a strong critique of the “backward” peo-
ple who want to keep women away from the “causes of the Umma” and con-
fine them to a purely domestic role. She recognises domestic tasks as essential 
female duties, but does not oppose them to political awareness: on the con-
trary, she claims, a household can be properly run only by a woman who har-
bours such awareness. In other words, Ahlam’s challenge to patriarchal values 
pertains less to the woman’s actual role in society than to her subjectivity: she 
must be a good housewife not out of blind imitation of tradition, but because 
her own personal, religious and political, convictions instruct her to be so. 
Many claim that girls should care only about cooking, washing up, and 
sweeping! They are pleased when a girl is “smart” and runs her house-
hold efficiently and without spending much, when she does not express 
many demands, and refrain from making many visits outside her home, 
but they forget something: if she is like that, it is because of her mindset, 
that is, of her concern for the problems of the umma! If you want a girl to 
73    Ibid.
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be worldly-minded, then expect her to be worldly in everything, greedy, 
and never satisfied with anything. 
The same people think they display a remarkable sense of compro-
mise and generosity when they allow (a girl) to read books and study reli-
gion, since for them, that creature called “woman” should not study 
religion! I heard a lady saying that very confidently. I told myself: “She 
must be kidding” . . . People with such amazing mentalities say: “That a 
girl stays idly by during her free times is better for us then those things” 
(they mean being concerned with the Muslims’ problems and suffering!).74
Shortly after her arrival to Syria, Ahlam saw her marital dream fulfilled when 
she espoused Abu Usama al-Gharib, alias Muhammad Mahmud, whom expert 
Guido Steinberg called an “enormously important” figure among global Jihadi 
networks.75 An Austrian citizen born in Vienna in 1985, Mahmud is the son 
of an Egyptian imam reported to have been a member of the militant Gamaa 
Islamiyya. Muhammad Mahmud spent four years in jail in Vienna for his role 
as the founder of the German branch of the pro-al-Qaeda Global Islamic Media 
Front.76 After his release in 2011, he moved to Germany, where he established 
a radical outfit called Millatu Ibrahim, now banned, and became the most 
prominent figure on the country’s Jihadi scene. By April 2012, his firebrand 
declarations—he vowed to “conquer Rome” in a Friday sermon—owed him 
to be expelled by Berlin’s authorities. He subsequently headed for Egypt, then 
Turkey, where he was arrested in the spring of 2013. He remained in custody 
until August 2014, when Ankara exchanged him, along 180 other militants, for 
49 Turkish hostages detained by ISO.77 He had thus just arrived in Raqqa when 
he married Ahlam.
Ahlam’s union with Abu Usama al-Gharib was brokered by two ISO mem-
bers, a man and a woman. Interestingly, Ahlam only names the latter one, 
thereby further inscribing herself in a female ideological genealogy: this bro-
ker is a legendary female Jihadi figure, Fatiha Mejjati, née Hassani, alias Umm 
Adam, whom Ahlam grants with the title of “mother of the mujahidin and 
74    Ibid.
75    The Local (Vienna), 5 November 2014, http://www.thelocal.at/20141105/austrian-jihadist- 
poses-in-front-of-corpses.
76    Guido Steinberg, German Jihad: On the Internationalisation of Islamist Terrorism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 133–39.
77    The Turkafile, 16 October 2014, http://www.turkafile.com/international/2014/10/16/
diken-isis-militant-wanted-by-austria-also-part-of-hostage-exchange/.
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terrorists”.78 A 53-year Moroccan, she became famous as the widow of Karim 
Mejjati, a leading Moroccan al-Qaeda operative who was killed by the Saudi 
police in 2005 along with his son Adam. A strong character taking credit for 
sparking her late husband’s religious and political awareness,79 Umm Adam 
later became one of the most vocal figures on the Moroccan jihadi scene.80 In 
2014, she publicly pledged allegiance to ISO, pushed her remaining son to vol-
unteer in the ranks of the organisation, then headed for Raqqa herself. She 
crossed the Turkish-Syrian border in early July 2014, a few days after the proc-
lamation of the Caliphate.81
The marriage between Ahlam, the daughter of a respected Damascene 
“house of knowledge”, and Abu Usama, an Austrian citizen, had considerable 
propaganda value for ISO, whose leadership probably instructed the brokers 
beforehand. ISO’s Syrian rivals have regularly attacked the group for being 
alien due to its heavy reliance on foreign fighters. While continuing to empha-
sise its universal character in order to recruit even more foreign manpower,82 
the organisation has simultaneously struggled to display symbols of its local 
anchorage, for instance by securing the formal allegiance of Syrian tribes.83 
From that perspective, Ahlam’s marriage was undeniably a master stroke, as it 
symbolised the union of an archetypical, Western foreign fighter with a mem-
ber of the Syrian urbanite upper middle-class, a social category that is gener-
ally perceived as harbouring little sympathy for ISO.
The story of Ahlam and Abu Usama’s marriage in the immediate aftermath 
of their arrival to Raqqa, along with ISO’s creation of a “Marriage Bureau” for 
women willing to marry its fighters,84 also plays into ISO’s recruitment strategy 
by demonstrating the organisation’s ability to provide an appealing incentive 
to its members. Ahlam’s once distant dream was to marry a soldier of God, but 
78    Nasr, Al-irhab.
79    Maroc Hebdo, 24 April 2009, http://www.maroc-hebdo.press.ma/Site-Maroc-hebdo/
archive/Archives_836/html_836/dans.html.
80    Romain Caillet, “L’influence de la guerre en Syrie sur le courant jihadiste marocain,” 
Religioscope. Études et analyses 33 (2014), http://religion.info/pdf/2014_04_Caillet.pdf. 
81    Morocco World News, 10 July 2014, http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/07/134293/
moroccos-fatiha-mejjati-joins-isis/.
82    See for instance ISO’s magazine Dabiq 1, 10, http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/
isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf.
83    Naser Ayed, “Jihadists and the Syrian tribes: Transient Hegemony and Chronic 
Dilemmas”, Arab Reform Initiative—Policy Alternatives (2015), http://www.arab-reform 
.net/sites/default/files/Jihadists%20and%20the%20Syrian%20Tribes%20Transient%20
Hegemony%20and%20Chronic%20Dilemmas.pdf.
84    Naharnet, 29 July 2014, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/140865.
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according to her, marriage in itself was not a problem, as indicated by her men-
tion of the many pretenders she rejected. Such a situation would be regarded 
with envy by young women who are less attractive on the marital market due 
to their lower social background, and might therefore face difficulties at mar-
rying at all. This problem is particularly acute in Northern African countries 
(a major pool of ISO volunteers),85 where women’s average age at first marriage 
has risen considerably over the last decades.86
Among low-income social categories in the region, family networks have 
been losing their ability to provide young women with marriage opportunities. 
Therefore, these young women are left on their own in a context where marital 
projects are hampered by the combination of rising unemployment with the 
inflation of marriage-induced financial expenses such as the dowry paid by the 
groom to her bride’s family, the acquisition of a house, and the organisation 
of an ostentatious wedding celebration. All of this is explicitly criticised by 
Ahlam, who derides the fact that “in our society, a boy and a girl cannot start 
their (common) life until they gather a gigantic amount of money and throw it 
by the window”, that is, by paying for an “enormous dowry” and “a celebration 
whose organisers see as the quintessence of religious observance on the mere 
basis that it is not mixed!”87Ahlam’s own wedding, on the contrary, seemed 
particularly austere, as it was apparently limited to a registration procedure at 
Raqqa’s Islamic court. 
Another aspect of Ahlam’s marriage that might look seducing to would-be 
volunteers of modest origin is the fact that in this union of the daughter of a 
wealthy and respected family with an outlaw who spent half of the past decade 
in jail, the traditional social order based on money and descent no longer 
exists. It is replaced with a new hierarchy based on ideological commitment, 
thereby offering prospects of a rapid social ascension regardless of one’s class 
origin. In other words, although Ahlam’s pedigree adds to ISO’ prestige, she 
85    Along with Saudi Arabia, Tunisia has provided the largest foreign contingent in Syria, 
with more than 3000 fighters by early 2015. Morocco came fourth, after Jordan, with 1500. 
Source: estimates by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Western 
governments, compiled by Radio Free Europe http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/
infographics/26584940.html.
86    That age ranges from 26 in Morocco (in 2004) to 31 in Libya (in 2006). This phenome-
non also exists in eastern Arab states, although in a less pronounced manner. Source: 
Quandl (https://www.quandl.com/c/demography/age-at-first-marriage-female-by-coun-
try); Françoise De Bel Air, “Mariage tardif et célibat au Moyen-Orient: quels enjeux ?,” 
in Barbara Drieskens (ed.), Les metamorphoses du mariage au Moyen-Orient (Beyrouth: 
Presses de l’IFPO, 2008), 119–50.
87    Nasr, Al-irhab.
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simultaneously feeds into the organisation’s utopian-egalitarian propaganda 
by marrying outside of her milieu. 
 Conclusion
Although it is likely that Ahlam al-Nasr would vehemently deny that she is a 
“feminist”, her travel account features elements that are commonly associated 
with women’s empowerment, such as a narrative overwhelmingly dominated 
by female heroes, an emphasis on the female narrator’s ownership of the key 
decisions that shaped her existence, that is, jihadi migration and the choice 
of a husband, and an appropriation of manly military symbols. Most of this 
is done at the discursive level and finds little practical implications: although 
Ahlam threatens to break with patriarchal authority if the latter stands in the 
way of her jihadi vocation (by fleeing home if her parents refuse to let her go 
to Raqqa, or by remaining single if she cannot marry a mujahid), she does no 
have to do so because things eventually fall into place; as for Ahlam’s aspira-
tions to become a warrior, they have not materialised (so far) beyond basic 
military training. 
It remains that, due to its propaganda nature, Ahlam’s travel account makes 
its author a model for a female audience that might perceive the type of femi-
ninity she represents as genuinely revolutionary. Let us not forget here that 
Ahlam’s familiarity with the idea of a politically conscious and active woman 
has its roots in the professional status of her mother thus, ultimately, in her 
origins in the educated upper middle-class. It would be hugely interesting, but 
totally out of the scope of this article, to see how Ahlam’s assertion of individ-
ual autonomy resonates with female ISO members and admirers coming from 
lower social background where the lack of cultural capital and professional 
opportunities structurally hinders similar assertions of female agency.
The texts studied in this article also provide an important insight into the 
kind of arguments used by ISO to convince new recruits to head for the land 
of the Caliphate. Ahlam does not do so by stressing the duty to help suffering 
Syrians, but by highlighting the advantages of life under ISO’s rule, namely, 
security, freedom to observe and impose the most uncompromising inter-
pretation of Islam, uncomplicated marriage, and above all, the possibility to 
become the master of one’s individual fate. Happiness, as Ahlam might have 
put it had she read Mao Zedong, grows out of the barrel of a gun.
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